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Preface
The failure of the Doha Development Round of World Trade Organization
(WTO) negotiations in July 2006 was the first major collapse of a multilat-
eral trade round since World War II. Research Associate Thomas I. Palley
sees the failure as an event that could mark the close of a 60-year era of
trade policy largely centered on increasing market access and reducing tar-
iffs, quotas, and subsidies. Doha’s demise represents an opportunity to
challenge the intellectual dominance of the current WTO paradigm, to
expose the failings of the neoliberal model of economic development, and
to reposition the global trade debate.
Palley suggests the development of an alternative trade agenda in asso-
ciation with an exposition of the faulty economics of the existing policy
paradigm. A critical element of the new agenda is the need to recognize
that trade is an instrument, not the ultimate goal, of policy. The real policy
goal is economic development in the context of a fair, inclusive, and polit-
ically acceptable globalization.
Palley notes that classical comparative advantage theory no longer cap-
tures what is happening in the global economy. New structures of global
production organized by multinational companies and retailing giants
have changed both the character and the margins of global economic com-
petition. The author also notes that free trade was not the route chosen by
industrialized countries in their early stages of economic development. He
furthernotesthateconomicpolicyhasneglectedthedevelopmentof domes-
tic demand, which has likely slowed growth and made it more unequal
between developed and developing countries.
A new, alternative policy paradigm that addresses the economic reali-
ties of trade and globalization should emphasize labor and environmental
standards, rules for exchange rates, and domestic demand-led development.
Wage income is a critical source of demand,so linking wages to productivity6 Public Policy Brief, No. 91
can promote a virtuous circle of inclusive economic development. Labor
standards are key because they are critical to establishing a floor for the
global economy. These standards should be part of the rules of the global
tradingsystemsothatsouthernhemisphereworkerscapturealargershareof
income, thus promoting domestic demand growth and mitigating competi-
tion between workers. Moreover, labor unions are essential to developing a
demand-ledsystemof economicgrowth,sincetheycorrectlabormarketfail-
ures and link wages to productivity in a decentralized fashion.
A post-Doha agenda must permit developing countries to use tariffs
and industrial policy as part of their economic development policy tool-
box,andpolicyshouldbefocusedonconsumptiongoodstariffs(asopposed
to imported capital goods tariffs). The restoration of autonomous national
policy (i.e., “policy space”) links with the need for good governance and
labor standards. This means that labor standards must be the bedrock of a
21st-century trade agenda aimed at refashioning globalization. There is
also a need for international environmental standards (e.g., stripping away
any competitive advantage achieved through environmental degradation),
as well as trade arrangements that incorporate exchange-rate provisions
explicitly. Palley suggests a tropical-products trade round involving com-
modities that are most beneficial to developing countries, such as sugar,
coffee, and rice.
In sum, trade policy must be intimately linked with rules for labor mar-
kets, the environment, and financial markets, and with an understanding
that trade impacts the character of competition, the socioeconomic struc-
ture, and policy space.
As always, I welcome your comments.
Dimitri B. Papadimitriou, President
October 2007The failure of the Doha Development Round of World Trade Organization
(WTO) negotiations in July 2006 represents an important event. Whereas
there have been broad public protests against the current global trading
system—Seattle in 1999, Cancun in 2003—this is the first full-blown col-
lapse of a multilateral trade negotiating round since World War II. That
collapse has created a significant opening for potentially repositioning the
global trade debate.
The failure of the Doha round does not signify the end of trade multi-
lateralism or a reversion to protectionism. Rather, it marks the close of a
60-year era of trade policy largely centered on increasing market access and
reducing tariffs, quotas, and subsidies. Behind this change is the growing
recognition that international trade is a critical element of globalization,
and that globalization is a larger, more complicated policy project than
merely facilitating cross-border flows of goods and services.
Tradeservestointegrateandunifyeconomies,which,astoutedbyadvo-
cates of trade liberalization, can often bring lower prices for consumers.
However,italsodramaticallyaltersthestructureanddynamicsof economies.
For developing countries, it changes the avenues and policy possibilities for
economic development. For developed countries, it restructures competi-
tion in both goods and labor markets, and the shift in balance of power
between workers and firms has broad economic and political ramifica-
tions. These issues have now risen to the surface (as evidenced by the gen-
eral public’s concerns about globalization),rendering anachronistic Doha’s
traditional multilateral trade-liberalization agenda.
Thenewcircumstancecreatesbothopportunityanddanger.Theoppor-
tunity is to construct a fresh approach to trade that incorporates rules gov-
erning the parameters of global competition and mediating the integration
of economies. Such rules can improve globalization by diminishing its
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impact on income distribution in developed countries,preventing race-to-
the-bottom competition between all countries, and promoting sustainable
economic development in developing countries. The danger is that this
opportunity is not taken, in which case it is possible there could be a slide
toward protectionism, particularly in the event of a deep global recession.
In effect, the failure of the Doha round signals the need for the cre-
ation of a 21st-century trade agenda that moves away from the traditional
focus on trade liberalization to address questions of how to govern global-
ization. Successfully accomplishing this transition will require the forma-
tion of a new intellectual and political consensus.
Why Did Doha Collapse?
A good starting point for assessing the future challenges and possibilities is
to examine why the Doha negotiations collapsed. One reason is that there
appears to be a growing recognition that trade is a complicated phenome-
non, and that the simple nostrums of“free trade”and“comparative advan-
tage” do not capture this complexity. This recognition is present in both
developing and developed countries. In middle-income countries (such as
Brazil and Argentina) and the large developing economies (such as India),
there is an increasing sense that traditional “Doha-style” trade agreements
potentially compromise their development strategies. This is because these
agreements rule out strategies and policies that favor domestically-based
production.
In conjunction, there has been growing anxiety among industrialized-
country electorates that traditional trade liberalization is driving an undesir-
able form of globalization.In particular,globalization has become identified
withwidening incomeinequality,wagestagnation atthebottomand middle
of the wage distribution, and undesirable forms of competition predicated
on the exploitation of workers and a disregard for the environment.
These electorate anxieties provided incentives and space for political
leaders—in both the United States and Europe—to distance themselves
from Doha’s business-driven trade-liberalization agenda. Moreover, this
lack of political support for the Doha round was further reinforced by agri-
cultural interests in both the United States and Europe. These interests, insectors such as sugar and cotton, were unwilling to give up existing subsi-
dies and price supports,and put their political muscle behind stalling Doha.
Lastly, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) contributed to derail-
ing the Doha round by unmasking the excessive claims about the economic
benefits of greater trade liberalization made by the international financial
institutions (e.g., the World Bank) and mainstream economists.1 In this
regard, the work of the NGOs was especially useful to developing-country
governments. These governments often lack the capacity for conducting
their own economic analysis—an informational gap that was filled by
NGO and activist research supporting developing-country arguments and
policy positions.
What Now?
The mainstream press has published much commentary about the threat
Doha’s failure poses to the multilateral trading system. For example, in
April 2006 the Financial Times published an op-ed by the chairmen of
Nokia and British Petroleum claiming that“the credibility of the multilat-
eral trading system”was at stake,and that failure of the round would“leave
the trading and investment environment seriously damaged” (Ollila and
Sutherland 2006). The following September, the Wall Street Journal pub-
lished a comment by Britain’s then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon
Brown, labeling Doha’s collapse a“protectionist backlash”(Brown 2006).
Such remarks misconstrue both the causes and the consequences of
Doha’s failure.Rather than signaling a threat to international trade and the
global economy,Doha’s demise represents an opportunity to reposition the
global trade debate. Taking advantage of this opportunity will require a
twin-track strategy. One track requires developing an affirmative alterna-
tive trade agenda that is intellectually coherent and politically compelling.
The other track requires continuing to chip away at support for the exist-
ing policy paradigm by exposing its faulty economics. Both tracks must be
pursued simultaneously if the opportunity provided by Doha’s failure is to
be taken advantage of.
A critical element of a new agenda is the need to premise the trade
debate on the recognition that trade is an instrument,and not the ultimate
goal,of policy.The real policy goal is economic development in the context
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of a fair, inclusive, and politically acceptable globalization. This goal must
frame a 21st-century trade agenda, which means abandoning the current
“trade for trade’s sake” approach to policy—an approach epitomized by
the metaphor, coined by C. Fred Bergsten, now director of the Peterson
Institute for International Economics,describing the global trade regime as
a bicycle that would fall over if the Doha round failed and further trade lib-
eralization stalled.
Challenging the Current WTO Paradigm
With regard to challenging the intellectual dominance of the current WTO
paradigm, it is critical to continue exposing the failings of the neoliberal
model of economic development that underlies the paradigm.This is a dif-
ficult task, because the neoliberal model is appealingly simple. First, it
asserts a“one-size-fits-all”approach to policy,whereby its recommendations
aresuitabletoallcountriesregardlessof stageof development.Second,these
policy recommendations are supposedly good for all,in the sense of always
generating win-win outcomes. Thus, the model asserts that if a country
adheres to a simple set of policies,includingWTO-style trade policies,both
the country and the global economy will benefit. This simplicity gives the
neoliberal model great rhetorical appeal, which continues to pull policy in
undesirable directions.
One approach to challenging the model is empirical. The economic
record shows that the neoliberal policy mix has not delivered—witness
Latin America, which applied the neoliberal Washington Consensus most
radicallyandyetgrewmoreslowlyinthepost-1980Consensusera(Ocampo
2002). A second empirical challenge concerns the evidence regarding the
relationship between trade and development. For instance, detailed statis-
tical work by Rodrik and Rodriguez (2001) challenges the hypothesis that
international trade spurs development, and instead suggests that countries
that develop successfully become successful traders.
Another form of challenge concerns the estimation of the size of the
welfare gains from further WTO-style trade liberalizations. One reason for
Doha’s failure was alternative model simulations showing that the pro-
posed trade liberalizations produced relatively small global economic
gains, even when these simulations used economic assumptions that pro-
duced gains from trade. Moreover, what gains there were accrued to theThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 11
developed-country bloc:the gains for developing countries as a whole were
approximately zero.There were also many significant net losers at the indi-
vidual developing-country level (Polaski 2006).
A third form of challenge concerns the economic theory that has been
used to justify and drive theWTO’s trade-liberalization agenda.That agenda
isjustifiedbyappealtotheclassicaltheoryof freetrade,whichispredicated
upon the logic of comparative advantage. However, classical comparative
advantage theory no longer captures what is happening in the global econ-
omy. Trade driven by global outsourcing is not a simple matter of balanced
exchange based on comparative advantage. Instead, it rests on the new
structures of global production organized by multinational companies and
retailinggiantssuchasWal-Mart,andthesestructureshavechangedboththe
character and the margins of global economic competition (Palley 2007).
In today’s world, where technology and methods of production are
highly mobile, winning at trade involves strategic policy—which includes
industrial policy, exchange rate policy, and tariffs. In such an environment,
classical free trade is not the best development path, and this is now being
confirmed by new theoretical evidence (Gomory and Baumol 2000;
Samuelson 2004; Palley 2006a). These new theoretical arguments are sup-
ported by economic history, which shows that free trade was not the route
chosen by today’s industrialized countries, including the United States, in
their early stages of economic development (Chang 2002).
Lastly,it is important not to be deceived by proposals that call for sim-
ply augmenting the Doha trade agenda with a new“helping hand”domes-
tic policy agenda that includes wage insurance (Kletzer and Rosen 2005).
Wage insurance aims to compensate workers who lose their jobs and end
up with lower wages because of trade-induced job loss.It is a welcome pol-
icy idea, as it helps reduce economic risk and improve social well-being.
Indeed, such insurance should be expanded to cover wider causes of job
loss. However, wage insurance does nothing to address the fundamental
failings of current trade policy, which rests on flawed economic logic. The
only comprehensive solution to the trade problem is a new trade regime.
Domestic Demand-led Development and Labor Standards
A post-Doha trade agenda should fit with new thinking about economic
development. Over the last two decades, economic policy has focused on12 Public Policy Brief, No. 91
international trade and growing the supply side, but policy has neglected
the development of domestic demand (Palley 2002, 2006b). This failure to
attend to domestic demand considerations has likely slowed growth and
made it more unequal between developed and developing countries.
With attention fixed on international competitiveness, holding down
costs and,therefore,wages is of primary importance.The focus on interna-
tional competitiveness has also encouraged retrograde competition, as
countries have tried to win competitive advantage by whatever means pos-
sible. Furthermore, this focus has contributed to destabilizing deflationary
conditions in the global economy, since countries have added to global
supply through export-led growth without similarly adding to global
demand (Blecker and Razmi 2005; Palley 2003a). These failings suggest
that policy must be repositioned so that it also focuses on developing the
demand side of emerging economies along with the supply side.
Developing the demand side in turn leads to a more inclusive agenda.
Rather than simply being a cost, wage income becomes a critical source of
demand. Linking wages to productivity can then promote a virtuous circle
of inclusive development. Higher productivity drives higher wages, which
in turn increase demand to absorb the increase in productivity.At the same
time, robust demand conditions encourage producers to invest, further
raising productivity and advancing development.
Labor standards are key for such a demand-led model of development,
as they help workers bargain for a fair share of productivity (Palley 2004,
2005). This points to the vital need for making labor standards part of the
rules of the global trading system.In a global economy,where countries are
pitted against one another through the activities of multinational corpora-
tions and global sourcing networks, labor standards are critical to estab-
lishing a floor for the global economy.
Historically,such standards have been represented as a form of“surro-
gate” protection intended to protect workers in the northern hemisphere
against competition from workers in the southern hemisphere.This misrep-
resents the reality. Wage differences between north and south are so large
that labor standards cannot significantly alter this source of southern com-
petitive advantage. However, they can help prevent unfair wage erosion in
the north, thereby actually maintaining wage differentials.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 13
Additionally, labor standards can help southern hemisphere workers
capture a larger share of income, thereby promoting domestic demand
growth that spurs inclusive economic development. Over the last 20 years,
innovations such as global sourcing have increasingly pitted southern
hemisphere workers against one another in ever-fiercer competition. This
has resulted in more of the global production value chain being shifted to
northern hemisphere economies, where it is captured at the retail end by
companies such as Wal-Mart, Nike, and Gap.2 By establishing a floor for
the global economy,labor standards are a means of mitigating competition
between southern hemisphere workers, thereby enabling the south as a
whole to capture more of the value it generates.
Labor standards give workers the right to form unions,and unions are
essential to developing a demand-led system of economic growth.The his-
tory of today’s developed economies (Western Europe, the United States,
Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand) shows that, at
some stage, all of them embraced trade unions as part of their transforma-
tion to mature developed-market status.
History suggests that unions are key to development, so the global
trading system should therefore foster unions instead of facilitating attacks
on them. Rather than being a market distortion, as claimed by neoclassical
economics,trade unions may correct market failure associated with imbal-
anced bargaining power.Viewed in this light,trade unions are the“market-
friendly” approach to correcting labor market failure, since unions set
wages in a decentralized fashion. Although wages are determined through
collective bargaining,they can differ across firms,with unions in more effi-
cient firms negotiating for higher wages than those set in less efficient
firms. In this fashion, democratic trade unions help establish a sustainable
income distribution tied to underlying productivity that can support a
consumer society.3
Tariffs and Industrial Policy
Another challenge for a post-Doha agenda is that it must permit develop-
ing countries to use tariffs and industrial policy as part of their economic
development policy toolbox. That suggests moving away from the existing
broad multilateral trade agenda in which the goal is total tariff removal to14 Public Policy Brief, No. 91
anarrower,moretargetedtradeagendainwhichtariffsareloweredinsome
areas and strategically maintained in others
For many developing countries, tariffs are a significant and efficient
source of government finance. These revenues are needed to fund public
investment and public services that are vital for development and for ensur-
ing that development serves all. They are an efficient source of finance
becausetariffsarerelativelyeasytocollect,sinceimportedgoodsareclosely
tracked and enter through a limited number of ports. At the same time,
developing countries often lack the administrative capacity to tax domestic
incomes and expenditures in the way that developed countries do.
Tariffs and industrial policy have also proven to be a valuable tool for
promoting growth. First, they offer a leg up to domestic producers so that
these producers can learn to compete. Second, they provide an incentive for
multinational corporations to produce within a country’s borders and thereby
avoid the tariffs imposed on imported production. These positive impacts
are confirmed by the historical record,which shows there was a positive corre-
lation between growth and tariffs in the 19th century (O’Rourke 2000).
Finally, as part of the reevaluation of the economic policy role of tar-
iffs, it is worth reviving and emphasizing the distinction between tariffs on
imported consumption goods and tariffs on imported capital goods. The
latter are an input into production so that capital-goods tariffs make a
country less competitive and hinder development by increasing the costs
of production. This suggests that the policy focus should be on consump-
tion goods tariffs. Additionally, to the extent that imported consumption
goods are luxury goods, this lends a progressive income-redistribution
dimension to tariffs.
The great challenge with tariffs and industrial policy is making sure
they do not become captured by special interests, causing them to become
sources of rent rather than a force for development. This speaks to placing
tariffs and industrial policy in a broader policy frame of domestic compe-
tition that ensures competition is not neglected. It also speaks to the
importance and challenge of good governance.
Policy Space,Governance,and Labor Standards
The need to restore a role for tariffs and industrial policy links with larger
concerns about “policy space” and how globalization is reducing suchThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 15
space.As capital becomes more mobile and policy works both to lower bar-
riers between economies and to synchronize rules across countries, the
space for autonomous national policy seems to be shrinking. Reestablishing
a role for tariffs and industrial policy can contribute to restoring policy
space. However, with restoration of policy space comes the need for good
governance, and that links back to the need for labor standards.
Not only do labor standards yield significant conventional economic
benefits for developing countries and the global economy, they also yield
significant political benefits. First, labor standards are strongly and posi-
tively associated with democracy (Palley 2005).Second,poor governance is
increasingly viewed as a significant obstacle to development. By giving
workers increased voice, labor standards may improve governance, giving
such standards an additional development rationale.
A perennial problem in developing countries is the problem of “Who
will guard the guardians?” Giving policymakers the space to conduct pol-
icy can be dangerous if the policymakers cannot be trusted. Free traders
often assert that free trade is a“two-for-one”; that is,it improves economic
efficiency and raises income,and it also guards the guardians by increasing
competition and competing-away rents. A parallel argument holds for
labor standards, which are also a two-for-one, since they (1) promote eco-
nomic development and (2) guard the guardians by strengthening worker
bargaining power and promoting democracy.
In a sense, labor standards are both a “means” and an “end” of devel-
opment. They are a means because they contribute to policy efficiency and
a structure of income distribution that advances development.They are an
end because they promote respect at work and greater political freedom.
Linking trade with labor standards can therefore ensure that trade serves to
promote development, and that globalization is fair, just, and politically
acceptable. This means that labor standards must be the bedrock of a
wholly new trade agenda aimed at refashioning globalization.
Movingthelaborstandardsagendawillrequireamultifacetedapproach.
At the national level, trade negotiators should make labor standards an offi-
cialpolicyprioritytobepushedinallmultilateralandregionalforums.Labor
standards should also be included in bilateral trade arrangements,and multi-
lateralprogresscanbeadvancedbybuildingupacoregroupof countriesthat
have signed on for labor standards at the bilateral level. Allowable trade16 Public Policy Brief, No. 91
preferences in the form of tariff and quota relief can also be used as a carrot
to induce developing countries to sign on to the labor standards agenda.
Most importantly, there is a need to change the climate of opinion about
labor standards, and to build a global echo chamber supporting such stan-
dards; the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, with their
massive networks of economists and public opinion outreach, must come
on board and endorse labor standards with vigor and openness. Finally,
NGOs have an important role to play in this process by directly advocating
labor standards and pushing governments and multilateral institutions to
make these standards part of the rules of the global economy.
Environmental Standards
In addition to labor standards, it is also clear that there is a need for inter-
national environmental standards, particularly regarding greenhouse gases
and global warming. Best of all would be the adoption of common, bind-
ing standards across countries. However, in the absence of common stan-
dards, countries will need to have the right to border-adjust for pollution
costs that have international impacts.4 Such border-adjustment is needed
to prevent the environment becoming part of the profit margin of interna-
tional economic competition, and to protect countries that impose high
environmental standards on domestic producers from unfair competition
from countries that impose low or no standards. The mechanism of pro-
tection is simple: imports from countries with low standards would face a
tariff equal to the international environmental costs of production,thereby
stripping away any competitive advantage achieved through environmen-
tal degradation.
Exchange Rates and Trade
A last critical element of a post-Doha trade agenda is exchange rates.
Historically, exchange rates have not been considered part of trade policy,
and they have been excluded from the rules governing international trade.
Instead, trade policy has focused on market access issues, tariffs, and sub-
sidies. This focus reflects the fact that exchange rates have been treated as a
financial matter that is separate and distinct from the real world of trade.
This policy dichotomy is reflected institutionally in the fact that exchange
rates are left to central banks and treasury departments.It also parallels theThe Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 17
thinking of economists who separate exchange rates from trade theory and
treat long-run trade patterns as being independent of exchange rates.
However, not only do exchange rates have temporary effects on trade
patterns, they can also have permanent long-run effects by influencing the
location of industries (Gomory and Baumol 2000; Palley 2003b, 2006a).
Moreover, these influences have become larger and more significant in the
era of globalization, because economies are more open and production is
more mobile.
Trade policy has yet to catch up with this fact, and still operates as if
trade and exchange rates were separate. In the United States, this policy
failure is evident in the China trade deficit.China has been pursuing a pol-
icy of export-led growth that relies on an undervalued exchange rate to
make its manufactured goods internationally competitive and to attract
new foreign direct investment in manufacturing.The result has been a tidal
wave of imports from China into the United States, closure of U.S. manu-
facturing plants that compete with Chinese goods, and the relocation of
production and new investment to China. The United States has been
stymied by this development because the trade agreement giving China
access to U.S.markets has no provisions guarding against the use of under-
valued exchange rates to gain market share. This situation is unsustainable
and could potentially generate a trade war.
Current U.S.-China trade problems, therefore, speak to the need for
future trade arrangements to explicitly incorporate exchange-rate provi-
sions. In the era of globalization, exchange rates matter more than ever—
which means that exchange-rate issues and disputes are likely to recur.
Absent provisions against inappropriate use of exchange rates as an instru-
ment of international competition, the global trading system could break
down. One risk is that it could collapse in a flurry of recriminations over
unfair trade deficits and resulting job losses. A second risk is that it could
be drawn into a round of competitive devaluation among countries,which,
in turn, could produce financial turmoil and economic dislocation remi-
niscent of the 1930s.
Guarding against these risks requires rules governing exchange rates
and trade, and the need for some form of global system of exchange-rate
management. That provides another illustration—this time concerning18 Public Policy Brief, No. 91
financial market arrangements—of how trade can no longer be considered
in isolation.
A“Tropical Products”Trade Round of Trade Liberalization
Reframing the global trade agenda to incorporate the above issues is likely
to take time, and likely to be contentious. In the meantime, while that
process works itself out, there is still some room for small-scale, targeted
multilateral trade liberalization that advances development in the southern
hemisphere while producing benefits in the northern hemisphere.
Advocates of a new global trade regime should support such measures, as
their support makes clear that they are not protectionist.
One suggestion for beneficial incremental trade liberalization is a
tropical-products trade round involving commodities such as sugar, cot-
ton, coffee,cocoa,rice,and orange juice (Palley 2006c).Such a trade round
could focus on those commodities that are most beneficial to developing
countries and those (northern) subsidies that are most damaging. Trade
predicated upon the theory of comparative advantage still holds for these
commodities, and there are trade gains to be had by all sides.
The advantages of a tropical-products trade round are numerous.
First, it would refute the charge of corporate globalizers who claim that
those who opposed the Doha round are opposed to trade in general.
Second, the tropics contain the world’s poorest countries, and a tropical-
products trade round would truly help them. The agricultural liberaliza-
tion proposed in the Doha round did not help tropical countries, because
they are significant importers of northern agricultural products (e.g.,cere-
als, meat, and dairy). Consequently, elimination of northern subsidies as
proposed under Doha would have raised world prices of those products,to
the detriment of southern countries.Contrastingly,a tropical-products trade
roundwouldreducenorthernproductionof tropicalproducts(cotton,sugar,
andsoon)thatcompetewithsouthernproduction,sothatanyinducedprice
increases would raise southern incomes to the benefit of the south.
In this regard, a tropical-products trade round that involves sugar
products, including ethanol, promises particularly clear economic and envi-
ronmental benefits. Current U.S. policy imposes a large tariff on Brazilian
sugar-based ethanol, which is the cheapest form of the fuel. That tariff has
encouragedproductionof U.S.corn-basedethanol,whichhasincreased U.S.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 19
demand for corn and driven up the price. That in turn has caused an
increase in food prices and contributed to higher inflation, which has hurt
consumers and the economy.Removing the tariff on imported sugar-based
ethanol provides a clear example of how a tropical-products trade round
could generate win-win outcomes.
More generally, there are good economic reasons for northern coun-
tries to support such a round.First,eliminating certain specific agricultural
subsidies would result in large government budget savings to northern tax-
payers. Second, consumers would gain, as prices decline with the elimina-
tion of quotas. Third, northern manufacturing workers would have no
interest in opposing a tropical-products round since they would benefit as
consumers and taxpayers,while manufacturing would essentially be off the
(bargaining) table. Fourth, northern production of tropical products is
often environmentally damaging, as exemplified by the impact of growing
sugar cane on Florida’s everglades. Finally, northern producers of tropical
products are poorly positioned politically to block such an approach, as
they tend to be large agrobusinesses whose political profile is unappealing.
This contrasts with confronting subsidies for dairy and grain farming,
which have a different political profile that includes small family farmers.
Politics and Ideas
For the last 50 years, trade agreements have emphasized market access and
tariff, quota, and subsidy reductions. Additionally, the last 20 years have
seen trade agreements increasingly peppered with intellectual-property
and investor protections. The failure of the Doha round of trade negotia-
tions suggests that this approach is politically exhausted.
In the public’s mind, trade is now firmly connected to globalization,
and trade and globalization are viewed as significantly responsible for wage
stagnation, widening income inequality, and increased job insecurity.
Trade may indeed result in increased exotic varieties of beer on supermar-
ket shelves,but that does not compensate for heightened economic insecu-
rity and the disconnection of wages from productivity growth
The new political conditions created by the realization that existing
trade policy and the current path of globalization are not serving ordinary
people well contributed importantly to the failure of the Doha round.20 Public Policy Brief, No. 91
Public disenchantment with globalization and existing trade policy points
to the need for a new policy paradigm that addresses the economic realities
of trade and globalization.Doha’s failure provides an opportunity to begin
transitioning to this much-needed new policy paradigm.
The corporate lobby that has driven the existing paradigm is extremely
powerful, and it stands ready to block change with claims that the eco-
nomic roof will cave in if countries abandon the path of neoliberal global-
ization. Countering these claims will require a two-pronged strategy that
exposestheoverlysimplisticeconomicsoftheneoliberalmodelwhileadvanc-
inganaffirmativealternativetradeparadigmthathaspoliticalappealanddis-
credits charges that those opposed to corporate globalization are Luddites,
or protectionistic.
That alternative paradigm, with its emphasis on labor standards,envi-
ronmental standards, rules for exchange rates, and domestic demand-led
development, is now clear to see. Trade policy cannot be developed in iso-
lation, as has been the past approach. Instead, it must be intimately linked
with rules for labor markets, the environment, and financial markets, and
with an understanding that trade impacts the character of competition,the
socioeconomic structure, and policy space.
The last quarter of the 20th century witnessed the birth of corporate
globalization,of whichtheDoharoundof trade-liberalizationnegotiations
was a part. Looking back, historians may one day view the failure of the
Doha round—the first round of multilateral trade negotiations to fail in 60
years—as a turning point. That failure makes space for a pause in reaching
global trade agreements—a pause that should be followed by reorientation
of the global economic system to include labor and environmental stan-
dards and a reining in of extreme corporate power.The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 21
Notes
1. See, for example, Polaski (2006).
2. Gereffi (1994) provides a seminal analysis of global value chains and
how the global sourcing strategies of U.S.retailers have shaped the dis-
tribution of value in the global economy. See also Hamilton (2005).
3. Thiscontrastswithagovernmentedictapproachtowagesetting.Anedict-
based approach can get income distribution right,but it is not sustainable
because it is not linked to underlying productivities. Consequently, it
results in mispricing and market distortions that disrupt and reduce
economic activity because wages and prices are set incorrectly.
4. Suchpollutioncanbedistinguishedfromlocalpollutionthatonlyaffects
the locale or country of production. There is a clear economic rationale
forborder-adjustingthecostsof internationalpollutionsincethosecosts
fall on others. How to deal with local pollution is more complex, the
claimbeingthatcountrieshavearighttochoosehowpollutedtheywant
their local environment to be so that local pollution should not be sub-
ject to international scrutiny and border adjustment.
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